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The President's Use of Troops to Enforce
Federal Law
George H. Faust*
T HE POLITICAL GENIUS OF MAN has failed to solve one ancient
and basic problem of politics. Briefly stated, it is as follows:
What shall be the proper division of authority among govern-
ments? How much authority shall be given to a central govern-
ment and how much shall be left to local or state governments?
In the awakening hours of recorded history man faced this prob-
lem. It is found in the history of Sumeria, Egypt, Babylonia,
Assyria and Persia. And within this century the imbalance of
governmental authority played a dominant role in the collapse
of the Chinese Dynastic System, the fall of the Ottoman Empire,
the eclipse of the Tsarist regime, and the Mexican Revolution.
The position taken recently by the Governor of Arkansas
points up the difficulty of the problem. The issue as he presented
it, was as follows: Integration as opposed to segregation; govern-
ment by injunction; intervention of federal troops within a state;
and, importation of a federal judge. In fact, none of these is the
issue. Correctly stated, the Arkansas situation posed this ques-
tion: Shall we maintain a federal system of law or shall one
man be allowed to alter the law by other than constitutional
procedure?
When we were part of the British Empire the same problem
was present and the inability of British statesmen to handle the
distribution of governmental authority was one of the main
reasons for the independence movement of the Thirteen Colonies.
As an ardent British imperialist, Benjamin Franklin presented
telling arguments at the Albany Conference in 1754 and in Lon-
don before the members of the British Parliament. Failing to
persuade either his fellow colonists or the leaders of state in
London of the proper division of governmental authority events
evolved until our Independence Movement became final. Being
successful in freeing themselves from British control, the people
of the independent states were confronted with the same problem
as before. Now the issue was the division 'of governmental au-
thority between the independent states and the central govern-
ment at Philadelphia.
* Member of the Ohio Bar; A.B., Henderson State Teachers College; M.A.,
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Under the Articles of Confederation, the Central Govern-
ment had no authority to deal with national problems in a
national way. Congress could enact laws but could not enforce
them; there was no central executive; there was no uniform
system of currency; there was no uniform control over com-
merce; and there was no uniform judicial system in operation.
These inadequacies caused a movement to change the Articles
of Confederation, leading to the adoption of the Constitution
of 1789.
In 1786, in Massachusetts, Shays lead a revolt of farmers
against the state assembly which was dominated by commercial
creditors. The farmers made the error of attacking the national
arsenal at Springfield. The militia was called to end the revolt.
The strife complained of by Shays' adherents was prevalent in
the United States. A strong central government was the answer.
Inspired by the fear of Shays Rebellion, the delegates at
Philadelphia assigned to Congress in the Constitution the power
"to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions." 1 All that
was needed was an enabling act to implement this provision.
On May 2, 1792, Congress provided an enabling act which
gave the Washington Administration the authority to suppress
the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. This occasioned the first instance
of the use of federal troops to suppress an internal insurrection.
This act was repealed. Subsequently, February 28, 1795, Con-
gress enacted legislation upon which all future use of federal
troops used in this manner has been predicated:
An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the
laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel inva-
sions.
Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, that whenever the
laws of the United States shall be opposed, or the execution
thereof obstructed in any State, by combinations too power-
ful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial pro-
ceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by this act,
it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call
for the militia of such state, or of any other state or states,
as may be necessary to suppress such combinations, and to
cause the laws to be duly executed.
Sec. 3. Provided, always, and be it further enacted, that
whenever it may be necessary, in the judgment of the Presi-
dent to use the military force hereby directed to be called
forth, the President shall forthwith, by proclamation, com-
1 Article 1, Section 8.
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mand such insurgents to disperse, and retire peaceably to
their respective abodes, within a limited time.
2
During the War of 1812, the government relied in part upon
the militia of the several states. Pursuant to the act of 1795, the
President issued a call for the militia. Some states cooperated,
others refused. Non-cooperating states said there was no in-
surrection, no invasion, and no laws were being obstructed.
Consequently, the federal government had no right to call the
state militia. The general Court of Massachusetts contended
that only the states had the power to decide whether or not
conditions existed justifying the use of state militia by the
federal government. 3
By 1827, the issue reached the United States Supreme
Court. Mr. Justice Storey, speaking for the Court, held that the
authority to decide whether the exigencies contemplated in the
Constitution had arisen was vested by the Constitution and the
statutes exclusively in the President, whose decision is con-
clusive upon all persons.4
And there the question rested during the years between
1827 and the election of President Abraham Lincoln in the fall
of 1860. Southern state leaders had announced that if a presi-
dent were elected which represented the North and Northeast
that Southern states would withdraw from the Union. Conse-
quently, the election of Lincoln gave impetus to the secession
movement. Lincoln's position was clearly stated in his first
inaugural address, March 4, 1861.
I hold that in contemplation of universal law and of the
Constitution the Union of these states is perpetual . . . The
Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed,
in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured
and continued by the Declaration of Independence in 1776.
It was further matured, and the faith of all the then thirteen
states expressly plighted and engaged that it should be per-
petual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And, finally,
in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and es-
2 Public Statutes at Large, Volume 1, page 264 gives the text of the act of
1792, and pages 424-425, the text of the act of 1795.
"First and last, between 1917 and 1922 soldiers were sent into states ...
more than thirty times, the majority of the instances being occasioned by
labor troubles." See Edward S. Corwin, The President Office and Powers,
1797-1948 (New York University Press, 1948). See especially pages 160-170
on "Military Power In Law Enforcement President Versus Congress."
3 Herman v. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations, 1906, No. 2, 13-15.
4 Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheaton 19 (1827).
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tablishing the Constitution was "to form a more perfect
Union." 5
Under mandate of the Constitution, the President has this
responsibility: "He shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed. . ." Upon the Congress the authority was placed
"To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." 7 In both
references the prime emphasis is upon the word "law." Not
until 1890 did the United States Supreme Court pronounce upon
the meaning of this word. Until that time the term "law" had
meant the Constitution, Acts of Congress, treaties, rules, ordi-
nances and regulations of the President. In the case In re Neagle,s
the Supreme Court gave the most expansive definition of the
word "law."
By direction of the Attorney General of the United States,
David Neagle, Deputy Marshal of the United States, was ap-
pointed to accompany Supreme Court Justice Field while on
circuit in California. There was ample reason to believe that
Justice Field would be assaulted by one Terry unless precautions
were taken. Neagle was given full authority to protect the
Justice and in so doing it was necessary to kill Terry. California
authorities arrested Neagle for murder. In time Neagle's peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus reached the Supreme Court.
California authorities argued that since there was no Act of
Congress, or Constitutional provision permitting the President
through the Attorney General to appoint a deputy marshal to
operate in the capacity that Neagle did, no such authority existed
for his action; consequently, Neagle was guilty of murder. The
Supreme Court stated the following:
While there is no express statute authorizing the appoint-
ment of a deputy marshal or any other officer to attend a
judge of the Supreme Court when traveling in his circuit,
and to protect him against assaults or other injury, the gen-
eral obligation imposed upon the President of the United
States by the Constitution to see that the laws be faithfully
executed, and that the means placed in his hands, both by
the Constitution and the laws of the United States to enable
him to do this, impose upon the Executive department the
duty of protecting a justice or judge of any of the courts of
5 VII Messages and Papers of the Presidents 3208.
6 Article 11, Section 6.
7 Article 1, Section 8.
8 135 U. S. 1 (1890).
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the United States when there is reason to believe that he
will be in personal danger while executing the duties of his
office....
And the Court continued by saying the President's duty is
not confined "to enforcement of Acts of Congress or of treaties
of the United States according to their express terms" but in-
cluded "the rights and obligations growing out of the Constitu-
tion itself, our international relations and all the protection
implied by the nature of the government under the Constitution."
The meaning of "law" was expanded in the Neagle case, but
In re Debs9 dilated this word even more while also enlarging the
power at the President's command to enforce the "law."
In the great Pullman strike of 1894, Eugene V. Debs, the
leader of the strikers, caused the disruption of the flow of inter-
state mail. To forestall further stoppage of the mail, a federal
court in Illinois issued an injunction against Debs and the
strikers, commanding them to cease such activities as would
prevent the flow of mail through interstate commerce. Faced
with the injunction, Debs and the strikers ignored the order.
Rioting ensued which caused President Grover Cleveland to
send troops into the State of Illinois to restore order, to enforce
the injunction as well as to prevent further obstruction of the
laws of the United States. Despite the protestations of Governor
Altgelt of Illinois, order was restored within Illinois by federal
troops. The ensuing imprisonment of Debs for violation of the
injunction resulted in the far reaching decision in 1895 by the
Supreme Court on the authority of the President to use the
power of his office to enforce federal law.
The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in
any part of the land the full and free exercise of all national
powers and the security of all rights entrusted by the Con-
stitution to its care. The strong arm of the national govern-
ment may be put forth to brush away all obstructions to the
freedom of interstate commerce or the transportation of the
mails. If the emergency arises, the army of the nation, and
all its militia, are at the service of the nation to compel
obedience to its laws.
Clearly this decision expands the coverage of protection to
"all rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care." And should
events require, "the army of the nation, and all its militia," are
available to enforce the Constitution.
9 185 U. S. 564 (1895).
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What is the position of the Supreme Court if an order or
injunction is issued by a court and subsequently violated while
still in force without a review by the court making the order or
by the Supreme Court? While an order is in force by any court,
its authority is continuous until the same has been withdrawn,
reversed upon rehearing by the same court or by a reviewing
court and this is true even though the original order is sub-
sequently held to be invalid. This position is clearly stated in
several cases.
If a party can make himself a judge of the validity of orders
which have been issued, and by his own act of disobedience
set them aside, then are the courts impotent and what the
Constitution calls the "judicial power of the United States"
would be a mere mockery. 10
In 1947, the Supreme Court issued a no strike injunction
against John L. Lewis and the United Mine Workers when the
nation's mines were under governmental control. Upon issuance
of the order, Lewis and the Mine Workers violated the order of
the court. A concurring decision written by Mr. Justice Frank-
furter states the following:
If one man can be allowed to determine for himself what is
law, every man can. That means first chaos, then tyranny.
Legal process is an essential part of the democratic process.
The legal process is subject to democratic control by de-
fined, orderly ways which themselves are a part of law. In
a democracy, power implies responsibility. The greater the
power that defies law the less tolerant can this court be of
defiance."
In this case, the Supreme Court fined Lewis $10,000 and the
United Mine Workers $700,000 for the violation of the injunction.
From some sources, it has been argued that the executive
was deprived of his power to enforce federal laws by the use
of either troops or the militia by the Posse Comitatus Act of
1956, and the Civil Rights Act of 1957. Nothing could more
patently show ignorance of the facts than such a conclusion.
The following is a complete statement of the Posse Comitatus
Act of 1956.
Sec. 1385. Use of Army and Air Force as posse comitatus.
Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances ex-
pressly authorized by the Constitution or act of Congress,
willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a
posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be
10 Gompers v. Buch Stove and Range Company, 221 U. S. 418, 450 (1911).
11 United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U. S. 258 (1947).
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fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
2 years, or both. This section does not apply in Alaska.' 2
As stated, the exceptions within this act clearly authorize
the use of the Army and Air Force to enforce the laws of the
nation because such is predicated upon the Constitution and
enactments by Congress as well as by decisions of the Supreme
Court. The illegality is present only when such forces are used
without the authority of the Constitution or acts of Congress.
Conflicting emotions over the Civil Rights Act of 1957, have
produced little examination of the act. The first portion of the
act states that in cases of criminal contempt the punishment shall
be either a fine or imprisonment, or both. When the defendant
is a natural person, the fine shall not exceed $1,000, nor shall
the imprisonment exceed six months. In such proceedings, at
the discretion of the trial judge, the case may be with or without
a jury. If the case is heard by a judge without a jury and the
sentence upon conviction is a fine in excess of $300.00 or im-
prisonment for a term in excess of 45 days, the accused, upon
demand, is entitled to a trial de novo before a jury, which shall
conform to the practice in other criminal cases. However, notice
the following provisions:
This section shall not apply to contempts committed in the
presence of the court or so near thereto as to interfere
directly with the administration of justice nor to the mis-
behavior, misconduct, or disobedience, of any officer of the
court in respect to the writs, orders, or process of the court.
Nor shall anything herein or in any other provision of
law be construed to deprive courts of their power, by civil
contempt proceedings, without a jury, to secure compliance
with or to prevent obstruction of, as distinguished from
punishment for violations, any lawful writ, process, rule,
decree, or command of the court in accordance with the
prevailing usages of law and equity, including the power
of detention.1
3
When the Governor of Arkansas sought to defy the order
of the federal court in Arkansas, he placed himself in the same
position as John L. Lewis in the United Mine Workers' case.
When the Governor said he could not allow his discretion to be
circumvented by that of the Federal Judge, he was vaulting
himself above the United States Supreme Court and the Presi-
12 United States Statutes at Large, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, 1956. Volume
70A. Title 10 & Title 32 of United States Code, p. 626.
13 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Approved September 7, 1957, Public Law 85-315;
Statute 634.
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dent of the United States. When the Supreme Court ruled
against segregation that decision became the law of the land to
be enforced by the federal courts and there is no issue of "im-
portation" of a foreign judge into Arkansas. When the order
was defied, when troops were sent to the scene to carry out its
enforcement and to suppress the nascent forces obstructing the
laws of the nation, all proceeded in conformity with the prece-
dent of revered statutes and decisions of the Supreme Court.
The question posed was that of sustaining a federal system of
law or its disruption with the chaos and tyranny that would
follow in its wake if any man can make himself a judge of the
validity of laws and by his own act of disobedience set them
aside. What the future will disclose as a result of these recent
events remains safely concealed within the womb of time.
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol7/iss2/17
